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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae respectfully submit this brief in support of
petitioner Mark Christeson.
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
Undersigned amici are non-profit groups who work to
improve criminal legal systems and share a strong interest
in ensuring that petitioners in capital federal habeas
proceedings receive robust enforcement of their right to
counsel. Death row inmates seeking federal habeas review
are entitled not just to a body at counsel table, but to
competent and meaningful representation. Nowhere is this
right more critical than in capital cases, where prosecutors
have chosen to seek execution instead of alternative
punishments. Amici believe the District Court’s order here,
and the Eighth Circuit’s decision affirming it, foreclose
meaningful representation and set dangerous precedent.
Should those rulings stand, capital post-conviction counsel
would be precluded from supplying the vigorous advocacy
their clients need by the very judiciary that acts as the last
mainstay for constitutional review before possible
execution.
National Association for Public Defense. The
National Association for Public Defense (NAPD) is an
association of more than 14,000 professionals who deliver
the right to counsel throughout all U.S. states and
territories.
NAPD
members
include
attorneys,
investigators, social workers, administrators, and other

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici certify that no party’s counsel
authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person or entity
other than amici or their counsel has made a monetary contribution to
the preparation or submission of this brief. Both parties consented to
the filing of this brief.
1
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support staff who are responsible for executing the
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel,
including regularly researching and providing advice to
clients in death penalty cases. NAPD’s members are the
advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and in communities and
are experts in not only theoretical best practices, but also
in the practical, day-to-day delivery of services. Their
collective expertise represents state, county, and local
systems through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel
delivery mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, capital and
appellate offices, and through a diversity of traditional and
holistic practice models. NAPD provides webinar-based
and other training to its members, including training on
the utmost importance of providing vigorous defense
advocacy in all phases of capital litigation. Accordingly,
NAPD has a strong interest in the issue raised in this case.
The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice
Center at St. Louis. The Roderick and Solange
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis (MJC-STL) is a
non-profit, public interest law firm that advocates positive
reform of the criminal justice system. MJC-STL is the
newest office of the Roderick and Solange MacArthur
Justice Center, which also has offices in Chicago (at the
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law), New Orleans, and
at the University of Mississippi Law School. The Roderick
and Solange MacArthur Justice Center was founded in
1985 by the family of J. Roderick MacArthur to advocate
for human rights and social justice through litigation. It
has led battles against myriad civil rights injustices,
including police misconduct, fighting for the rights of the
indigent in the criminal justice system, and pursuing
compensation for the wrongfully convicted.
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) is a nonprofit voluntary professional bar
association that works on behalf of criminal defense
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attorneys to ensure justice and due process for those
accused of crime or misconduct. NACDL was founded in
1958. It has a nationwide membership of many thousands
of direct members, and up to 40,000 with affiliates.
NACDL’s members include private criminal defense
lawyers, public defenders, military defense counsel, law
professors, and judges. NACDL is the only nationwide
professional bar association for public defenders and
private criminal defense lawyers. NACDL is dedicated to
advancing the proper, efficient, and just administration of
justice. NACDL files numerous amicus briefs each year in
the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal and state courts,
seeking to provide amicus assistance in cases that present
issues of broad importance to criminal defendants,
criminal defense lawyers, and the criminal justice system
as a whole. NACDL has a particular interest in this case,
having participated throughout the proceedings.
National Legal Aid & Defender Association. The
National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA),
founded in 1911, is America’s oldest and largest nonprofit
association devoted to excellence in the delivery of legal
services to those who cannot afford counsel. For 100
years, NLADA has pioneered access to justice and right to
counsel at the national, state, and local level. NLADA
serves as a collective voice for our country’s public defense
providers and civil legal aid attorneys and provides
advocacy, training, and technical assistance to further its
goal of securing equal justice. The Association pays
particular attention to procedures and policies that affect
the constitutional rights of the accused, both adults and
youth.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves federal courts doubling down on
the effective denial of counsel to a severely mentally
impaired capital habeas petitioner on the eve of his
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execution, thereby preventing the full and fair litigation of
an issue that demands this Court’s attention: the role
played by a petitioner’s mental impairment in determining
whether equitable tolling applies to the statute of
limitations for filing a habeas petition. This Court should
grant the petition to address whether the denial of
adequate funding in this case constituted a constructive
denial of the right to counsel required by the capital
representation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3599, the Constitution,
and this Court’s decisions—including the previous
decision in this very case. It did, and the issue matters not
only in this case, but in every case where attorneys
represent indigent clients with budgets subject to judicial
control.
The issue is of heightened importance where, as here,
federal habeas relief is the last, best hope for state prisoners
to correct constitutional defects in their convictions.
Robust federal review is especially critical in capital cases
to prevent the execution of the innocent and to ensure
fairness in sentencing. The process is so important, and so
complex, that Congress codified the right to counsel in
such proceedings in Section 3599.
That right includes not only the right to experienced
attorneys, but also to non-attorney members of the defense
team such as investigators and experts. The right becomes
meaningless if counsel cannot retain that assistance in
order to take basic steps necessary for providing adequate
representation. In Mr. Christeson’s case, those basic,
necessary steps include retaining non-attorney team
members to assist in the investigation, evaluation, and
presentation of new and complex mental health evidence
regarding the “severe cognitive disabilities that lead him to
rely entirely on his attorneys” to his detriment. Christeson v.
Roper, 135 S.Ct. 891 (2015). That evidence is critical to a
full and fair hearing on how a prisoner’s mental
impairments affect the balancing of the equities under
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Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), in determining
whether the deadline for filing a habeas petition should be
tolled—including where, as here, original habeas counsel
unconscionably allows that deadline to lapse by 117 days
before ever visiting their client.
Federal habeas counsel cannot conscript the nonattorney team members required to assist in the
investigation, evaluation, and presentation of such
critically important evidence. Absent government funding,
section 3599 counsel also are powerless to hire those
critical members of the defense team. The absurdly low
and unjustified budget order in this case denied the
resources necessary to retain that assistance and
constituted the effective denial of counsel. Such orders are
dangerous not only because they put at risk the fair,
accurate resolution of issues in capital cases; they also
create unnecessary conflicts of interest by forcing counsel
to choose between working on capital cases for no
remuneration or focusing their energy on privately paid
cases. Indeed, inadequate funding can be even more
dangerous than the failure to appoint counsel altogether,
because it gives the false impression that attorneys are
working for the client, when in fact those attorneys cannot
do their jobs.
This Court’s precedents stress the importance of
providing adequate counsel and adequate resources in
capital cases—especially when, as here, the client is
severely impaired and unable to contribute meaningfully
to his own defense. This Court’s prior decision in this case
thus acknowledged that the appointment of substitute
counsel was required under the statute. The proceedings
below flouted that order by effectively denying substitute
counsel the opportunity to investigate, evaluate, and
present the evidence necessary for a full and fair hearing
on the central issues in the case. This Court should grant
the petition for certiorari, reverse the decision below, and
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remand for new proceedings in which counsel receives the
resources necessary to achieve that full, fair hearing.
ARGUMENT
The arbitrarily allocation of $10,000 for the litigation
of the Rule 60(b) motion in this case, when Mr.
Christeson’s attorneys had reasonably requested $161,000
to support the investigation and presentation of mental
health evidence directly relevant to central issue of
equitable tolling, constituted the effective denial of the
statutory right to federal habeas counsel. This Court
should grant certiorari to hold that courts must provide
sufficient resources for capital defense counsel to perform
the tasks required of them.
I.

Section 3599 Requires, In Addition To The
Appointment Of Counsel, The Allocation Of
Adequate Resources To Litigate Capital
Cases.

In creating a mandatory statutory right to appointed
counsel in capital habeas proceedings in Section 3599,
Congress underscored the important role such proceedings
play in “promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition
of the death penalty.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859
(1994); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
This “right to counsel necessarily includes a right for that
counsel meaningfully to research and present a defendant’s
habeas claims.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 858; see also Martel
v. Clair, 132 S.Ct. 1276, 1285 (2012).
Beyond this, Section 3599 expressly provides
protections to ensure representation by highly qualified
and effective defense teams in capital post-conviction
proceedings. For instance, attorney members of the postconviction team must have significant past experience in
both serious felonies and appellate practice. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3599(c). Such experience should not be compensated at
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the rate of an intern or an entry-level attorney with no
habeas experience.
Section 3599 additionally embodies the idea that postconviction representation requires significant fact and
mitigation investigation beyond that conducted by prior
counsel at the trial or direct appeal stages. See 18 U.S.C. §
3599(g)(2). Since counsel cannot conscript the assistance
necessary to undertake such investigations, the statute also
expressly contemplates the provision of funds necessary
for retaining services of experts, such as forensic
psychologists, medical professionals, and trauma
specialists. Id.
At an absolute minimum, Congress contemplated
that attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants
both before and after conviction would abide by
professional norms. This Court has long referred to the
ABA’s Guidelines as “well-defined norms” for capital
defense teams and “guides to determining what is
reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522, 524
(2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
The ABA’s guidance establishes without a doubt that
adequate funding is a necessary prerequisite to effective
representation. Competent evaluation of potential habeas
claims requires counsel to review voluminous court
records, often spanning years if not decades, and to be
well-versed in what has been described as “some of the
most complicated, dynamic, and at times inconsistent
bodies of law that exist.” Michael Millemann, Capital PostConviction Petitioners’ Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to
Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 Md. L. Rev.
455, 487 (1989); Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1, ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Capital
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1085
(2003) (“ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines”) (“providing
high quality legal representation in collateral review
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proceedings in capital cases requires enormous amounts of
time, energy and knowledge”); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), r. 1.1 cmt. These
heightened duties necessarily include not only advocacy,
but also investigation, aided by appropriate professionals
and experts.
Mitigation specialists in particular, like the ones
requested by counsel here, are critical members of capital
post-conviction defense teams. See Guideline 4.1, ABA
Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 952; Mark
E. Olive & Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in
Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picture in Post-Conviction,
36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1067, 1076-77 (2008); Emily Hughes,
Mitigating Death, 18 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 337 (June
2009). Thus their retention is not a mere suggestion—it is
the professional norm by which counsel’s effectiveness and
reasonableness is measured. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387.
Their assistance is especially important where, as here,
counsel enters late after prior counsel’s abandonment of
the client, and new evidence reveals the need to
investigate, evaluate, and litigate complex mental health
issues.
Indeed, where a capital defendant’s mental health or
intellectual capacity is at issue, the use of medical and
scientific experts is essential. See, e.g., Brumfield v. Cain, 135
S. Ct. 2269, 2275-79 (2015) (relying heavily on hard
science, including medical evidence and expert reports, in
remanding for hearing on capital petitioner’s intellectual
functioning); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014)
(“That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures
consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in
determining intellectual disability is unsurprising . . . In
determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is
proper to consult the medical community’s opinions.”); see
also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381. Given this necessity, the
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ABA Guidelines mandate that one member of the defense
team must have specialized training on various mental
health and psychological issues. Olive & Stetler,
Supplementary Guidelines, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 683
(Guideline 5.1).
At the same time that counsel must meet heightened
investigative and forensic demands presented by capital
post-conviction cases, they owe a continuing ethical duty
to provide competent representation to clients. See Model
Rules, r. 1.1 (competent representation), r. 1.3 (diligence)
and r. 1.4 (communication with client) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002). Lawyers are subject to disciplinary action should
they fail to meet this obligation, and they are responsible
for making reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of
non-lawyer defense team members conforms with the
professional rules. See Model Rules, r. 5.3.
Without the requisite funds, counsel cannot afford to
satisfy their obligations to conduct an extensive capital
mitigation investigation required by this Court’s
precedents and ABA guidelines. At the same time, they
cannot afford not to meet those unambiguous professional
and ethical obligations. Thus, inadequate budget orders
can create dangerous conflicts of interest that force counsel
to choose between working on a low-paying or nonpaying
case versus working on a paid case, with the possibility of
covering overhead and keeping a practice afloat weighing
in the balance. See Lawrence Fox, Capital Guidelines and
Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Responsibilities, 36
Hofstra L. Rev. 775, 780-81 (2008).
The foregoing rules stem from a practical
understanding of the importance of representation in
capital cases. Indeed, federal habeas relief is particularly
crucial to ensure compliance with core constitutional
guarantees in states where public defense systems are at
risk. Missouri is such a state. The public defender system
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is ranked 49th in the country for funding, its director filed
suit to obtain funds withheld by the executive branch, and
the Governor himself was conscripted to represent an
indigent defendant. Matt Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve
as a Public Defender, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 4, 2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/w
hen-thegovernor-is-your-lawyer/494453/. Thus, Missouri
is near the top of the list for states whose capital cases fall
through the cracks—creating a real risk that the innocent
or undeserving will be executed. Without robust federal
review, necessarily including capable counsel with
adequate
resources,
that
risk
becomes
both
unconstitutional and, as a matter of policy, intolerable.
II.

The
Lower
Courts
Arbitrarily
And
Unlawfully Denied Christeson Adequate
Funding To Prepare His Motion.

In this case, Mr. Christeson’s attorneys presented a
proposed budget of $161,000 to the district court, which
included funds for their investigation as well as for the
time of non-attorney professionals including an
investigator, a neuropsychologist, a neuroimaging analyst,
and a disabilities specialist. The budget explained how the
money would be used and why it was necessary. The
district court denied it as excessive and allocated instead a
total budget of $10,000, including any fees for necessary
experts. See Dkt.#122, at 2. That number seems to have
been chosen arbitrarily; certainly the district court
provided no reasoned basis for choosing the number it did.
That figure also was absurdly low in light of the stakes
of the case and the amount of work required to prepare the
motion. First, on a simple back-of-the-envelope basis, the
budget would have paid for 55 attorney hours at the
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prevailing Missouri rate of $180 per hour.2 There simply is
no way that attorneys could review the voluminous case
record,3 conduct the necessary additional investigation,
and then prepare and file the motion in such a short time
period. Even accounting for the fact that the attorneys had
done some of this work prior to their appointment (in
connection with the motion to substitute counsel), the
budget would have been insufficient—whether or not the
attorneys attempted to hire a single outside expert to assist
them.
But outside expertise was critical to the full and fair
development, presentation, and hearing of new evidence
that substitute counsel unearthed in this case. That
evidence indicates that Mark Christeson’s severe mental
health impairments warrant equitable tolling because they
inhibited his ability to act in his own behalf by “pursuing
his rights diligently” when prior habeas counsel failed to
do so and because they contributed to the “extraordinary
circumstance(s)” that prevented timely filing of the habeas
petition in this case. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010). Thus, the new evidence in this case raises
extremely complicated questions of both fact and law
regarding the effect of mental illness on the attorney-client
relationship. Those questions include the appropriate
allocation of responsibility under Holland for counsel’s

This is calculated from the rate of compensation in death
penalty cases as of March 2015 (when the budgeting briefing was
submitted to the District Court): $180 per hour. See
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cjainformation (last visited 8/3/2016).
2

Included in the record were 20 boxes of documents from the
state trial and post-conviction proceedings that contained hundreds of
pages of motions and transcripts from the seven-day trial as well as
police reports, dozens of witness interviews and depositions, DNA
and other lab reports, and appellate briefs. Tpp. 16, 20.
3
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failures to investigate a mentally impaired client’s case, to
communicate with that client, and to act on binding
precedent that was literally right in front of their faces
instead of blowing the deadline for challenging the
constitutionality of that client’s impending execution. See
Jonathan Atkins et al., The Inequities of AEDPA Equitable
Tolling: A Misapplication of Agency Law, 68 Stan. L. Rev.
427, 450-459 (2016) (addressing appropriate balancing of
equities).
To state the obvious, accurate resolution of the
equitable tolling issue under Holland is impossible without
full and fair development and presentation of evidence on
Mr. Christensen’s mental impairments because there is a
reciprocal relationship between the severity of those
impairments and the injustice of forcing him to bear
responsibility for counsel’s misconduct. In the flexible,
fact-specific inquiry mandated by Holland, more severe
impairments should lighten the duty of diligence. See, e.g.,
Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010).
Conversely, there is little dispute that disabled clients
impose higher standards of responsibility on counsel,
which increase the extraordinary nature of misconduct
involving such clients. See Alabama Ethics Opinion RO95-03 (“every degree that … testimony and evidence
proved a [client’s] less than normal mental and functional
capacity … raises[s] by an equivalent degree the standard
of conduct which the Court must require … in [counsel’s]
dealings with the client.”); see also American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense
Function, Standard 4-3.1(c); Mo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.14,
Client with Diminished Capacity.
The budget order in this case ensured that accurate
resolution of those critical issues would be impossible
because that order prevented current counsel from hiring
the trained investigator and mental health and disability
experts required to develop and present the necessary
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evidence. To be sure, every refusal to pay for an
investigator or expert is not a constructive denial of
counsel. At minimum, however, a district court should
have to explain why a proposed budget is excessive or why
an alternative budget reasonably allows counsel to
undertake the investigation and presentation of evidence
necessary for full, fair, and accurate resolution of the
central issue in the case.
The courts below did neither. The district court’s
budget order was not just conclusory; it attempted to
recast a funding order that effectively denied Mr.
Christensen his statutory right to counsel as a mere
“dispute” about the approved amount. See Dkt.#122, at 2
(quoting Rojem v. Workman, 655 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir.
2011)). The district court then sought to shield the budget
order from appellate review. See Dkt.#122, at 2 (citing In re
Carlyle, 644 F.3d 694, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2011) (Riley, C.J.,
in chambers)). The Eighth Circuit panel’s cursory review
ignored both the denial of counsel and the resulting
structural flaw that permeates these proceedings and
creates the risk of wrongful execution.
The panel then added insult to injury by asserting that
“no lawyer is entitled to full compensation for services for
the public good.” Op. 7 (citing Carlyle, 644 F.3d at 699700). This observation ignores the fact that Missouri
banned conscription of counsel decades ago. State v. Green,
475 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971). It also wrongfully
equates Mr. Christeson’s right of counsel with his
attorneys’ request to be paid, thereby ignoring the
consequences to the client that result from underfunding a
4

Presumptive fees for such services are $85-100 per hour for
mitigation investigators and $200-375 per hour for mental health
experts. See, e.g., United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit CJA Policy and Procedure Manual Appendix E (2015).
4
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capital habeas investigation. Moreover, even if one were
to entertain the notion that courts can conscript lawyers
into public service, lawyers cannot conscript investigators
and other experts necessary to develop complex mental
health evidence in a capital habeas case. By denying
counsel the resources required to hire those non-legal
members of the defense team, the lower courts effectively
denied Mark Christeson a statutory right to counsel that
implicates the constitutional rights to due process and a
fair hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3599; see Celestine Richards
McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital
Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of
Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31 (2003).
III.

This Issue Is Critically Important And
Warrants This Court’s Immediate Review.

The issue of funding for federal capital habeas cases is
critically important and warrants this Court’s immediate
review. There is an ongoing crisis in the capital defense bar
due to a lack of qualified counsel. See, e.g.,Welsh S. White,
Litigating in the Shadow of Death: Defense Attorneys in Capital
Cases 4-10 (2006). Indeed, “[t]he lack of adequate counsel
to represent capital defendants is likely the gravest of the
problems that render the death penalty, as currently
administered, arbitrary, unfair, and fraught with serious
error—including the real possibility of executing an
innocent person.” The Constitution Project, Mandatory
Justice: The Death Penalty Revisited 1 (2005).
The result is that the quality of death penalty defense
and our system of justice are both suffering. Id. Capital
attorneys are not taking the most basic steps necessary for
effective advocacy. White, supra. Mr. Christeson’s original
habeas counsel provide a vivid illustration of this
phenomenon. The lower court rulings in this case will
further chill quality capital representation by sending a
clear message that courts can, with impunity, deny the

15
resources that are required to develop and present
evidence in post-conviction cases. The same message can
only dissuade experienced and qualified attorneys from
entering or remaining in this field.
Decades ago, the ABA warned about this
phenomenon its 1989 Capital Counsel Guidelines:
Unreasonably low fees not only deny the
defendant the right to effective representation . . . .
They also place an unfair burden on skilled
criminal defense lawyers, especially those skilled
in the highly specialized capital area. These
attorneys are forced to work for next to nothing
after assuming the responsibility of representing
someone who faces a possible sentence of death.
Failure to provide appropriate compensation
discourages
experienced
criminal
defense
practitioners from accepting assignments in
capital cases (which require counsel to expend
substantial amounts of time and effort).
Commentary to Guideline 10.1, ABA Capital Counsel
Guidelines
(1989),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrate
d/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/1989guidelin
es.authcheckdam.pdf.
Studies have proved those warnings prescient. For
example, the ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines cited
several studies which demonstrated an increasing
reluctance by experienced counsel to take on capital cases
in light of cost concerns. See Commentary to Guideline
9.1, ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at
986. One of those studies, out of Texas, showed that,
“more and more experienced private criminal attorneys”
were refusing to accept appointments in capital cases at
least in part because of “the lack of compensation for
counsel fees and experts/expenses and the enormous
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pressure that they feel in handling these cases.” Id. (citing
The Spangenberg Group, A Study of Representation in
Capital Cases in Texas (1993)).
Similarly, a survey of Mississippi attorneys appointed
to represent indigent capital defendants found that 82%
would “either refuse or be very reluctant to accept another
appointment because of financial considerations.”
Commentary to Guideline 9.1, ABA Capital Counsel
Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 986 (citing Ruth E.
Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama’s Capital
Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 Ala. L.
Rev. 1, 31 n.148 (1992)); see also Fox, Capital Guidelines and
Ethical Duties, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 779-80 (undercompensating lawyers and non-lawyers would impede
ability to secure their services, “leaving only those
desperate for work—but unqualified to handle it – willing
to accept these engagements.”).
The inevitable result of this thinning of the capital
defense bar is that innocent people will be executed
because they lack minimally competent representation at
all levels of the judicial system. Currently, rates of
exoneration among capital defendants are far higher than
for any other category of criminal convictions due in large
part to the greater attention and resources devoted to death
penalty cases before and after conviction. Samuel R. Gross,
et al., Rate of false conviction of criminal defendants who are
sentenced to death, 111 PNAS, no. 20, May 20, 2014, at
7230-7235 (estimating that 4.1% of defendants sentenced
to death from 1973 through 2004 were the result of
erroneous convictions). But as the strength of the postconviction review process fades, the risk of erroneous
execution rises.
This case provides an ideal vehicle to address
precisely this issue. By granting certiorari and reversing the
lower court rulings, this Court can send a clear signal that
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federal courts must allocate appropriate budgets for federal
capital defense efforts, and renew the bar’s incentives to
take up this critically important work.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, as well as those stated in the
Petition, certiorari should be granted.
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